@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp16165,
            	author={Hackmann, Martin B. and Pohl, Vincent and Ziebarth, Nicolas R.},
            	title={Patient versus Provider Incentives in Long-Term Care},
            	year={2023},
	month={May},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={16165},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp16165},
	abstract={How do patient and provider incentives affect the provision of long-term care? Our analysis of 551 thousand nursing home stays yields three main insights. First, Medicaid-covered residents prolong their stays instead of transitioning to community-based care due to limited cost-sharing. Second, when facility capacity binds, nursing homes shorten Medicaid stays to admit more profitable out-of-pocket private payers. Third, providers react more elastically to financial incentives than patients. 
Thus, targeting provider incentives through alternative payment models, such as episode-based reimbursement, is more effective than increasing patient cost-sharing in facilitating transitions to community-based care and generating long-term care savings.
},
	keywords={cost-sharing;provider incentives;patient incentives;nursing homes;long-term care;episode-based reimbursement;Medicaid},
            }