%0 Report
        %A Jost, Peter J.
%A Kräkel, Matthias
        %T Preemptive Behavior in Sequential Tournaments
        %D 2000
        %8 2000 May
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 159
        %U https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp159
        %X Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequentially. We show that agents’ strategic behavior significantly differs in sequential tournaments compared to simultaneous tournaments. In a sequential tournament, under certain conditions the first acting agent chooses a preemptively high effort so that the following agent gives up. In general, the principal will prefer simultaneous tournaments in which preemptive behavior is impossible.
        %K sequential tournaments
%K rank-order tournaments
%K Preemptive behavior