@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp14843,
            	author={Gibson, Matthew},
            	title={Employer Market Power in Silicon Valley},
            	year={2021},
	month={Nov},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={14843},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp14843},
	abstract={Adam Smith alleged that employers sometimes secretly collude to reduce labor earnings. This paper examines an important case of such behavior: illegal no-poaching agreements through which information-technology companies agreed not to compete for each other's workers. Exploiting the plausibly exogenous timing of a US Department of Justice investigation, I estimate the effects of these agreements using a difference-in-differences design. Data from Glassdoor permit the inclusion of rich employer- and job-level controls. On average, the no-poaching agreements reduced salaries at colluding firms by 4.8 percent. Stock bonuses and ratings of job satisfaction were also negatively affected. These estimates are consistent with considerable employer market power.},
	keywords={oligopsony;employer market power;labor earnings;monopsony},
            }