TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Butz, Britta
AU  - Alvarez, Pablo Guillen
AU  - Harbring, Christine
        TI  - Incentives for Cooperation in Teams: Sociality Meets Decision Rights
        PY  - 2021/Apr/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 14242
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp14242
        AB  - We investigate the effect of a donation incentive tied to contributions to a public good when group members can decide on the size of the donation to be made. An up to 20 % donation of the public good was implemented either exogenously or endogenously by group members. In the Vote treatment, groups could either decide in favor of or against a donation of 20 % of the public good; in the Vote Share treatment, subjects could decide on a donation share of between 0 % and 20 %. Results show that a large percentage of the participants vote in favor of implementing a donation share in both treatments. Voting in favor of a 20 % donation share or endogenously implementing a high donation share in the Vote Share treatment has positive effects on contributions to the public good compared to an exogenously implemented donation share.
        KW  - laboratory experiment
KW  - team incentives
KW  - public good game
KW  - decision right
KW  - donations
KW  - charitable giving
        ER  -