TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Bassanini, Andrea
AU  - Caroli, Eve
AU  - Fontaine, Francois
AU  - Rebérioux, Antoine
        TI  - Escaping Social Pressure: Fixed-Term Contracts in Multi-Establishment Firms
        PY  - 2021/Jan/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 14029
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp14029
        AB  - We develop a simple theoretical model showing that, by adding to the adjustment costs associated with permanent contracts, local social pressure against dismissals creates an incentive for CEOs to rely on fixed-term contracts, in an attempt to escape social pressure. Using linked employer-employee data, we show that establishments located closer to headquarters have higher shares of fixed-term contracts in hiring than those located further away whenever firms' headquarters are located in self-centered communities and the CEO not only works but also lives there. We show that these findings can only be explained by local social pressure.
        KW  - social pressure
KW  - employment contracts
KW  - adjustment costs
KW  - CEO reputation
        ER  -