TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Calsamiglia, Caterina
AU  - Martínez-Mora, Francisco
AU  - Miralles, Antonio
        TI  - School Choice Design, Risk Aversion, and Cardinal Segregation
        PY  - 2020/Jul/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 13464
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp13464
        AB  - We embed the problem of public school choice design in a model of local provision of education. We define cardinal (student) segregation as that emerging when families with identical ordinal preferences submit different rankings of schools in a centralised school choice procedure. With the Boston Mechanism (BM), when higher types are less risk-averse, and there is sufficient vertical differentiation of schools, any equilibrium presents cardinal segregation. Transportation costs facilitate the emergence of cardinal segregation as does competition from private schools. Furthermore, the latter renders the best public schools more elitist. The Deferred Acceptance mechanism is resilient to cardinal segregation.
        KW  - school choice mechanisms
KW  - cardinal segregation
KW  - segregation
KW  - peer effects
KW  - local public goods
        ER  -