%0 Report
        %A Garcia, Thomas
%A Massoni, Sebastien
%A Villeval, Marie Claire
        %T Ambiguity and Excuse-Driven Behavior in Charitable Giving
        %D 2019
        %8 2019 Dec
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 12869
        %U https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp12869
        %X A donation may have ambiguous costs or ambiguous benefits. Behavior in a laboratory experiment suggests that individuals use this ambiguity strategically as a moral wiggle room to act less generously without feeling guilty. Such excuse-driven behavior is more pronounced when the costs of a donation – rather than its benefits – are ambiguous. However, the importance of excuse-driven behavior is comparable under ambiguity and under risk. Individuals exploit any type of uncertainty as an excuse not to give, regardless of the nature of this uncertainty.
        %K ambiguity
%K excuse-driven behavior
%K social preferences
%K charitable giving
%K experiment