TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Abebe, Girum
AU  - Fafchamps, Marcel
AU  - Koelle, Michael
AU  - Quinn, Simon
        TI  - Learning Management through Matching: A Field Experiment Using Mechanism Design
        PY  - 2019/Aug/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 12572
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp12572
        AB  - We place young professionals into established firms to shadow middle managers. Using random assignment into program participation, we find positive average effects on wage employment, but no average effect on the likelihood of self-employment. We match individuals to firms using a deferred-acceptance algorithm, and show how this allows us to identify heterogeneous treatment effects by firm and intern characteristics. We find striking heterogeneity in self-employment effects, and show that some assignment mechanisms can substantially outperform random matching in generating employment and income effects. These results demonstrate the potential for matching algorithms to improve the design of field experiments. 
        KW  - propensity score
KW  - field experiments
KW  - management practices
KW  - self-employment
KW  - causal inference
        ER  -