TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Pinto, Marco de
AU  - Goerke, Laszlo
        TI  - Efficiency Wages in Cournot-Oligopoly
        PY  - 2019/May/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 12351
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp12351
        AB  - In a Cournot-oligopoly with free but costly entry and business stealing, output per firm is too low and the number of competitors excessive, assuming labor productivity to depend on the number of employees only or to be constant. However, a firm can raise the productivity of its workforce by paying higher wages. We show that such efficiency wages accentuate the distortions occurring in oligopoly. Specifically, excessive entry is aggravated and the welfare loss due to market power rises. 
        KW  - oligopoly
KW  - efficiency wages
KW  - excessive entry
KW  - welfare
        ER  -