@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp1193,
            	author={Huck, Steffen and Seltzer, Andrew and Wallace, Brian},
            	title={Deferred Compensation and Gift Exchange: An Experimental Investigation into Multi-Period Labor Markets},
            	year={2004},
	month={Jun},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={1193},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp1193},
	abstract={This paper examines the relationship between firms’ wage offers and workers’ supply of effort
using a three-period experiment. In equilibrium, firms will offer deferred compensation: first
period productivity is positive and wages are zero, while third period productivity is zero and
wages are positive. The experiment produces strong evidence that deferred compensation
increases worker effort; in about 70 percent of cases subjects supplied the optimal effort
given the wage offer, and there was a strong effort response to future-period wages. We also
find some evidence of gift exchange; worker players increased the effort levels in response to
above equilibrium wage offers by a human, but not in response to similar offers by a
computer. Finally, we find that firm players who are initially hesitant to defer compensation
learn over time that it is beneficial to do so.},
	keywords={gift exchange;deferred compensation;pensions;experimental labor economics;personnel economics;incentives;shirking},
            }