TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Feess, Eberhard
AU  - Frick, Bernd
AU  - Muehlheusser, Gerd
        TI  - Legal Restrictions on Buyout Fees: Theory and Evidence from German Soccer
        PY  - 2004/Jun/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 1180
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp1180
        AB  - We perform a theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of transfer fee regulations on
professional soccer in Europe. Based on a model on the interaction of moral hazard and
heterogeneity, we show (i) how the regulations effect contract durations and wages, (ii) that
contracting parties have an incentive to agree upon inefficiently long contracts, (iii) how these
incentives vary with the legal system, and (iv) how the relationship between contract duration
and performance also depends on the legal system. With one exception, all theoretical
results are empirically confirmed using a comprehensive data set from the top German
Soccer League ("Bundesliga").
        KW  - Labor contracts
KW  - Bosman judgement
KW  - empirical contract theory
        ER  -