@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp11387,
            	author={Kukharskyy, Bohdan and Pflüger, Michael P.},
            	title={Time Is on My Side: Relational Contracts and Aggregate Welfare},
            	year={2018},
	month={Mar},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={11387},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp11387},
	abstract={This paper develops a simple general equilibrium model which establishes a link between the patience of economic agents and the well-being of nations. We show that firms in long-term oriented countries can mitigate hold-up inefficiencies by engaging with their suppliers in relational contracting – informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships. Our model predicts that countries with a higher level of patience will exhibit greater economic well-being and higher total factor productivity. We provide empirical evidence in line with the predictions of our theory.},
	keywords={time preferences;relational contracting;aggregate welfare;TFP},
            }