TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Baharad, Eyal
AU  - Danziger, Leif
        TI  - Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?
        PY  - 2018/Jan/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 11287
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp11287
        AB  - We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result is that neither the widely used plurality rule nor the inverse-plurality rule are ever optimal, and that the Borda rule is hardly ever optimal. Furthermore, we show that only the almost-plurality, the almost-inverse-plurality, and the almost-Borda rule can be optimal. Which of the "almost" rules is optimal depends on the likelihood that a candidate has high ability and how likely committee members are to correctly identify the abilities of the different candidates.
        KW  - committee decisions
KW  - scoring rules
KW  - "almost" voting rules
        ER  -