@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp10881,
            	author={Dasgupta, Indraneel and Neogi, Ranajoy Guha},
            	title={Between-Group Contests over Group-Specific Public Goods with Within-Group Fragmentation},
            	year={2017},
	month={Jul},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={10881},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp10881},
	abstract={We model a contest between two groups of equal population size over the division of a group-specific public good. Each group is fragmented into sub-groups. Each sub-group allocates effort between production and contestation. There is perfect coordination within sub-groups, but sub-groups cannot coordinate with one another. All sub-groups choose effort allocations simultaneously. We find that aggregate rent-seeking rises, social welfare falls, and both communities are worse off when the dominant sub-groups within both communities increase their population shares relative to the respective average sub-group population. 
Any unilateral increase in fragmentation within a group reduces conflict and makes its opponent better off. The fragmenting community itself may however be better off as well, even though its share of the public good falls. Thus, a reduced share of public good provisioning cannot be used to infer a negative welfare implication for the losing community.},
	keywords={contest;group-specific public good;local public good;ethnic conflict;within-group fragmentation},
            }