TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Mechtenberg, Lydia
AU  - Muehlheusser, Gerd
AU  - Roider, Andreas
        TI  - Whistle-Blower Protection: Theory and Experimental Evidence
        PY  - 2017/Mar/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 10607
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp10607
        AB  - Whistle-blowing by employees plays a major role in uncovering corporate fraud. Various recent laws aim at improving protection of whistle-blowers and enhancing their willingness to report. Evidence on the effectiveness of such legislation is, however, scarce. Moreover, critics have raised worries about fraudulent claims by low-productivity employees. We study these issues in a theory-guided lab experiment. Easily attainable ("belief-based") protection indeed leads to more reports, both truthful and fraudulent. Fraudulent claims dilute prosecutors' incentives to investigate, and thereby hamper deterrence. These effects are ameliorated under more stringent ("fact-based") protection. 
        KW  - business ethics
KW  - whistle-blowing
KW  - corruption
KW  - corporate fraud
KW  - cheap-talk games
KW  - lab experiment
        ER  -