%0 Report
        %A Mechtenberg, Lydia
%A Muehlheusser, Gerd
%A Roider, Andreas
        %T Whistle-Blower Protection: Theory and Experimental Evidence
        %D 2017
        %8 2017 Mar
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 10607
        %U https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp10607
        %X Whistle-blowing by employees plays a major role in uncovering corporate fraud. Various recent laws aim at improving protection of whistle-blowers and enhancing their willingness to report. Evidence on the effectiveness of such legislation is, however, scarce. Moreover, critics have raised worries about fraudulent claims by low-productivity employees. We study these issues in a theory-guided lab experiment. Easily attainable ("belief-based") protection indeed leads to more reports, both truthful and fraudulent. Fraudulent claims dilute prosecutors' incentives to investigate, and thereby hamper deterrence. These effects are ameliorated under more stringent ("fact-based") protection. 
        %K business ethics
%K whistle-blowing
%K corruption
%K corporate fraud
%K cheap-talk games
%K lab experiment