TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Martins, Pedro S.
        TI  - Working to Get Fired? Regression Discontinuity Effects of Unemployment Benefit Eligibility on Prior Employment Duration
        PY  - 2016/Oct/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 10262
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp10262
        AB  - In most countries, the unemployed are entitled to unemployment benefits only if they have previously worked a minimum period of time. This institutional feature creates a sharp change at eligibility in the disutility from unemployment and may distort the duration of jobs. In this paper, we evaluate this eligibility effect using a regression discontinuity approach. Our evidence is based on longitudinal social security data from Portugal, where the unemployed are required to work a relatively long period to collect benefits. We find that monthly transitions from employment to unemployment increase by 10% as soon as the eligibility condition is met. This result is driven entirely by transitions to subsidised unemployment, which increase by 20%, as non-subsidised unemployment is not affected. The effects are even larger for the unemployed with high replacement ratios or those who meet the eligibility condition from multiple short employment spells.
        KW  - employment duration
KW  - moral hazard
KW  - unemployment insurance
KW  - big data
        ER  -