%0 Report
        %A Martins, Pedro S.
        %T Working to Get Fired? Regression Discontinuity Effects of Unemployment Benefit Eligibility on Prior Employment Duration
        %D 2016
        %8 2016 Oct
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 10262
        %U https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp10262
        %X In most countries, the unemployed are entitled to unemployment benefits only if they have previously worked a minimum period of time. This institutional feature creates a sharp change at eligibility in the disutility from unemployment and may distort the duration of jobs. In this paper, we evaluate this eligibility effect using a regression discontinuity approach. Our evidence is based on longitudinal social security data from Portugal, where the unemployed are required to work a relatively long period to collect benefits. We find that monthly transitions from employment to unemployment increase by 10% as soon as the eligibility condition is met. This result is driven entirely by transitions to subsidised unemployment, which increase by 20%, as non-subsidised unemployment is not affected. The effects are even larger for the unemployed with high replacement ratios or those who meet the eligibility condition from multiple short employment spells.
        %K employment duration
%K moral hazard
%K unemployment insurance
%K big data