@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp10262,
            	author={Martins, Pedro S.},
            	title={Working to Get Fired? Regression Discontinuity Effects of Unemployment Benefit Eligibility on Prior Employment Duration},
            	year={2016},
	month={Oct},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={10262},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp10262},
	abstract={In most countries, the unemployed are entitled to unemployment benefits only if they have previously worked a minimum period of time. This institutional feature creates a sharp change at eligibility in the disutility from unemployment and may distort the duration of jobs. In this paper, we evaluate this eligibility effect using a regression discontinuity approach. Our evidence is based on longitudinal social security data from Portugal, where the unemployed are required to work a relatively long period to collect benefits. We find that monthly transitions from employment to unemployment increase by 10% as soon as the eligibility condition is met. This result is driven entirely by transitions to subsidised unemployment, which increase by 20%, as non-subsidised unemployment is not affected. The effects are even larger for the unemployed with high replacement ratios or those who meet the eligibility condition from multiple short employment spells.},
	keywords={employment duration;moral hazard;unemployment insurance;big data},
            }