%0 Report
        %A Fehrler, Sebastian
%A Fischbacher, Urs
%A Schneider, Maik T.
        %T Who Runs? Honesty and Self-Selection into Politics
        %D 2016
        %8 2016 Oct
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 10258
        %U https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp10258
        %X We examine the incentives to self-select into politics and how they depend on the transparency of the entry process. To this end, we set up a two-stage political competition model and test its key mechanisms in the lab. At the entry stage, potential candidates compete in a contest to become their party's nominee. At the election stage, the nominated candidates campaign by making non-binding promises to voters. Confirming the model's key predictions, we find in the experiment that dishonest people over-proportionally self-select into the political race; and that this adverse selection effect can be prevented if the entry stage is made transparent to voters.
        %K lying aversion
%K experiment
%K political economy
%K voting
%K contest
%K primaries
%K campaigns
%K cheap talk
%K elections
%K candidates
%K self-selection