@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp10258,
            	author={Fehrler, Sebastian and Fischbacher, Urs and Schneider, Maik T.},
            	title={Who Runs? Honesty and Self-Selection into Politics},
            	year={2016},
	month={Oct},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={10258},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp10258},
	abstract={We examine the incentives to self-select into politics and how they depend on the transparency of the entry process. To this end, we set up a two-stage political competition model and test its key mechanisms in the lab. At the entry stage, potential candidates compete in a contest to become their party's nominee. At the election stage, the nominated candidates campaign by making non-binding promises to voters. Confirming the model's key predictions, we find in the experiment that dishonest people over-proportionally self-select into the political race; and that this adverse selection effect can be prevented if the entry stage is made transparent to voters.},
	keywords={lying aversion;experiment;political economy;voting;contest;primaries;campaigns;cheap talk;elections;candidates;self-selection},
            }