Kurs "Behavioral Labor Economics"

Prof. Dr. Armin Falk

• Falk, A., Fehr, E., Why Labour Market Experiments, Labour Economics 10 (2003) 399-406.
• Fehr, E., Falk, A., 2002. Psychological Foundations of Incentives, European Economic Review 46, 687-724.
• Fehr, E., Gächter, S., Kirchsteiger, G., 1997. Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device - experimental evidence. Econometrica 65, 833-860.
• Gächter, S., Falk, A., 2002. Reputation and Reciprocity - Consequences for the Labour Relation, in: Scandinavian Journal of Economics 104 (2002), 1-26.
• Falk, A., Kosfeld, M., 2004. Distrust - The Hidden Cost of Control, IZA DP 1203
• Gneezy, U., Rustichini, A., 2000a. A Fine is a price. Journal of Legal Studies 29, 1-17.
• Gneezy, U., Rustichini, A., 2000b. Pay enough or don't pay at all. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (2), 791-810.
• Camerer, C., Babcock, L., Loewenstein, G., Thaler, R., 1997. Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time, The Quarterly Journal of Economics (1997): 407-441.
• Lorenz Götte, David Huffman and Ernst Fehr, Loss Aversion and Labor Supply, in: Journal of the European Economic Association, 2004, 2 (2-3), 216-228.
• Card, David and Krueger, Alan B. 1994. Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. The American Economic Review, Vol. 84, no. 4, 772-793.
• Falk, A., Fehr, E., Zehnder, C., 2004. The Behavioral Effects of Minimum Wages, IZA DP 1625
• Fehr, E. and Falk, A. 1999. Wage Rigidity in a Competitive Incomplete Contract Market. Journal of Political Economy 10. 106-134.
• Brown, M., Falk, A., Fehr, E., Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions, in: Econometrica 72 (2004), 747-780.

I. Introduction (Slides)
	a.    Advances in Behavioral Economics, ed. By Colin C. Camerer, G. Loewenstein and M. Rabin, Princeton University Press 2004.
	b.    Falk, A., Fehr, E., Why Labour Market Experiments, Labour Economics 10 (2003) 399-406.
II. Psychology of incentives (Slides)
	a.    Reciprocity and contract enforcement
		i.    Fehr, E., Falk, A., 2002. Psychological Foundations of Incentives, European Economic Review 46, 687-724.
		ii.    Fehr, E., Gächter, S., Kirchsteiger, G., 1997. Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device - experimental evidence. Econometrica 65, 833-860.
		iii.    Gächter, S., Falk, A., 2002. Reputation and Reciprocity - Consequences for the Labour Relation, in: Scandinavian Journal of Economics 104 (2002), 1-26.
		iv.    Fehr, E., Klein, A., Schmidt, K.M., 2001. Fairness, incentives and contractual incompleteness. Working Paper No. 72, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich.
	b.    Dysfunctional effects of explicit incentives
		i.     Falk, A., Kosfeld, M., 2004. Trust and Incomplete Contracts
		ii.    Gneezy, U., Rustichini, A., 2000a. A Fine is a price. Journal of Legal Studies 29, 1-17.
		iii.    Gneezy, U., Rustichini, A., 2000b. Pay enough or don't pay at all. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (2), 791-810.
		iv.    Gneezy, U. 2004. The W effect of incentives. The University of Chicago Graduate School of Business.
		v.    E. Fehr, Rockenbach, B., 2002. Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism, NATURE 422, 15 March 2002, 137-140.
	c.    Peer effects
		i.    Falk, A., Ichino, A. 2003. Clean evidence on peer effects. IZA Discussion paper 732.
		ii.    Ichino A. and G. Maggi, 2000. Work Environment and Individual Background: Explaining Regional Shirking Differentials in a Large Italian Firm. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (2000), 1057-1090.
		iii.    Zajonc, Robert B., "Social Facilitation", Science 149 (1965), 269-274.
	d .    Loss aversion, collusion and sabotage in the presence of tournament incentives
		i.    Bull, C., Schotter, A., Weigelt, K., 1987. Tournaments and piece rates: an experimental study. Journal of Political Economy 95, 1-33.
		ii.    Falk, A., Fehr, E. 2002. The Power and Limits of Tournament Incentives, unpublished manuscript.
		iii.    Harbring, C., Irlenbusch, B., 2003. An experimental study on tournament design. Labour Economics 10, 443-464.
III. Labor supply (Slides1, Slides2)
		i.    Camerer, C., Babcock, L., Loewenstein, G., Thaler, R., 1997. Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time, The Quarterly Journal of Economics (1997): 407-441.
		ii.    Fehr, Götte, Do Workers Work More if Wages are High? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment. IEW Working Paper No. 125.
		iii.    Goette, Lorenz and David Huffman (2003), Reference-Dependent Preferences and the Allocation of Effort over Time: Evidence from Natural Experiments, Mimeo. Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich.
IV. Market behavior (Slides)
	a.    Monopsony and minimum wages
		i.    Card, David and Krueger, Alan B. 1994. Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. The American Economic Review, Vol. 84, no. 4, 772-793.
		ii.    Falk, A., Fehr, E., Zehnder, C., 2004. The Behavioral Effects of Minimum Wages, Working paper.
	b.    Fairness, efficiency wages and wage rigidities
		i.    Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., Riedl, A., 1993. Does fairness prevent market clearing? An experimental investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 58, 437-460.
		ii.    Fehr, E. and Falk, A. 1999. Wage Rigidity in a Competitive Incomplete Contract Market. Journal of Political Economy 10. 106-134.
	c.    Incomplete contracts, fairness and the functioning of markets
		i.    Brown, M., Falk, A., Fehr, E. "Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions", Forthcoming in: Econometrica.
		ii.    Kirchsteiger, G., Niederle, M., Potters, J. 2001. "Public versus private exchanges", Working paper 2001, Tilburg University.
		iii.    Brown, M., Falk, A., Fehr, E., 2003. Competition and Implicit Contracts. Working paper, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich.