| |
| |
|
Behavioral and Personnel Economics
|
|
|
|
<
Behavioral and Personnel Economics
Behavioral and Personnel Economics
Behavioral and Personnel Economics
Behavioral and Personnel Economics
Behavioral and Personnel Economics
Behavioral and Personnel Economics
Behavioral and Personnel Economics
Behavioral and Personnel Economics
Behavioral and Personnel Economics
Behavioral and Personnel Economics
Behavioral and Personnel Economics
Behavioral and Personnel Economics
Behavioral and Personnel Economics
Behavioral and Personnel Economics
Behavioral and Personnel Economics
Behavioral and Personnel Economics
Behavioral and Personnel Economics
Behavioral and Personnel Economics
Behavioral and Personnel Economics
Behavioral and Personnel Economics
|
This page is maintained by Steffen Altmann. What makes some employment relationships successful, and causes others to fail? What is the role of government and the law in enhancing the performance of existing and new employment relationships? These are key questions for personnel economics. Its primary goal is to understand the relationship between institutions and employee performance. Recent research in behavioral economics has begun to enhance our understanding of the psychological foundations of incentives, and demonstrates that performance does not depend only upon the relationship between measured performance and pay, but also upon many other features of the workplace environment, including employee morale, job security, and the perceived "fairness" of one's pay. The purpose of this program is to find ways to model and measure these institutions and then to assess the importance that they play in determining employee performance. The results from this research can inform both businesses and government on the best way to manage their employees and improve existing laws and regulations.
For general information about this program area, please contact: persecon@iza.org
Core Members of this Program Area:
Dr. Steffen Altmann,
Senior Research Associate
Affiliated Members of this Program Area include:
Alpaslan Akay, Ph.D.,
Senior Research Associate
Dr. Patrick Arni,
Research Associate
Prof. Dr. Marco Caliendo,
Program Director and Visiting Research Fellow
Philipp Doerrenberg,
Resident Research Affiliate
Dr. Anne C. Gielen,
Senior Research Associate
Prof. Peter J. Kuhn, Ph.D.,
Visiting Research Fellow
Prof. Hartmut Lehmann, Ph.D.,
Program Director and Visiting Research Fellow
Prof. Andrew J. Oswald, Ph.D.,
Visiting Research Fellow
Prof. Dr. Gerard A. Pfann,
Visiting Research Fellow
Nuria Rodriguez-Planas, Ph.D.,
Visiting Research Fellow
Zahra Siddique, Ph.D.,
Senior Research Associate
Please click here to see the full list of IZA Research Fellows affiliated
with this Program Area.
|
|
|
Armin Falk,
Program Director, University of Bonn
|
| |
Steffen Altmann,
Deputy Program Director, IZA
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Events |
|
|
| Back to the top |
Projects |
Understanding Default Effects: Psychological Foundations, Economic Consequences and Implications for Public Policy
| Funded by: |
Volkswagen Foundation |
| Project Start: |
2011/04/01 |
| Project leader(s): |
Steffen Altmann (IZA) |
| Participants: |
Armin Falk (University of Bonn and IZA), Nicolas Kaufung (IZA) |
| Short Description: |
In many important situations of economic and social life, people make choices that are embedded into a system of non-binding default rules. These default options specify what happens if a decision maker stays passive and omits making an active decision. Although from a traditional economic perspective default rules should not influence decisions, a growing body of literature documents substantial effects of default rules on behavior, e.g., in decisions on retirement savings, registration for organ donation, or purchasing of cars and other consumption goods.
The research project aims at enhancing our understanding of such default effects, their economic consequences, and policy implications. The following questions will be addressed: Why do non-binding default rules influence behavior? Are there systematic differences in the degree to which defaults affect individual behavior? How does the specification of defaults interact with other environmental factors, such as the complexity of the decision environment or the identity of the institution that implements the default rule? What are the welfare implications of default rules? In particular, can and should defaults be used as an instrument of public policy in the spirit of a “libertarian paternalistic” policy approach, and is there need for regulating the use of default rules by companies in order to protect consumers? The questions will be analyzed using a multidisciplinary approach that relies on economic theory and behavioral experiments and integrates insight from cognitive psychology and neurobiology.
|
Last updated: 2011/06/29
|
| show past projects |
| Back to the top |
Recent Discussion Papers
|
| No. |
Author(s) |
Title |
Date |
PDF |
Link to Abstract |
| 6322 |
Michael Gibbs |
Design and Implementation of Pay for Performance (forthcoming in: Oxford Handbook in Managerial Economics) |
January 2012 |
 |
Abstract
|
| 6320 |
Anne C. Gielen, Jan C. van Ours |
Unhappiness and Job Finding |
January 2012 |
 |
Abstract
|
| 6316 |
Loukas Balafoutas, Florian Lindner, Matthias Sutter |
Sabotage in Tournaments: Evidence from a Natural Experiment |
January 2012 |
 |
Abstract
|
| 6311 |
Felipe Kast, Stephan Meier, Dina Pomeranz |
Under-Savers Anonymous: Evidence on Self-Help Groups and Peer Pressure as a Savings Commitment Device |
January 2012 |
 |
Abstract
|
| 6304 |
Roman M. Sheremeta, Steven Y. Wu |
Testing Canonical Tournament Theory: On the Impact of Risk, Social Preferences and Utility Structure |
January 2012 |
 |
Abstract
|
| 6290 |
Roland Benabou, Jean Tirole |
Laws and Norms |
January 2012 |
 |
Abstract
|
| 6286 |
Andrea Hammermann, Alwine Mohnen, Petra Nieken |
Whom to Choose as a Team Mate? A Lab Experiment about In-Group Favouritism |
January 2012 |
 |
Abstract
|
| 6284 |
Andrea Hammermann, Alwine Mohnen |
Who Benefits from Benefits? Empirical Research on Tangible Incentives |
January 2012 |
 |
Abstract
|
| 6280 |
D. Mark Anderson, Daniel I. Rees, Joseph J. Sabia |
High on Life? Medical Marijuana Laws and Suicide |
January 2012 |
 |
Abstract
|
| 6279 |
Oriana Bandiera, Iwan Barankay, Imran Rasul |
Team Incentives: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment (forthcoming in: Journal of the European Economic Association, 2012) |
January 2012 |
 |
Abstract
|
| 6277 |
Christian Thöni, Simon Gächter |
Peer Effects and Social Preferences in Voluntary Cooperation |
January 2012 |
 |
Abstract
|
| 6272 |
Nick Drydakis |
Men's Sexual Orientation and Job Satisfaction (revised version forthcoming in: International Journal of Manpower) |
January 2012 |
 |
Abstract
|
| 6266 |
Laurens Cherchye, Ian Crawford, Bram De Rock, Frederic Vermeulen |
Aggregation without the Aggravation? Nonparametric Analysis of the Representative Consumer |
December 2011 |
 |
Abstract
|
| 6265 |
Richard Akresh, Joyce J. Chen, Charity Moore |
Altruism, Cooperation, and Efficiency: Agricultural Production in Polygynous Households |
December 2011 |
 |
Abstract
|
| 6254 |
Lucia Marchegiani, Tommaso Reggiani, Matteo Rizzolli |
How Unjust! An Experimental Investigation of Supervisors' Evaluation Errors and Agents' Incentives |
December 2011 |
 |
Abstract
|
| 6249 |
Xiaoyan Lei, John Strauss, Meng Tian, Yaohui Zhao |
Living Arrangements of the Elderly in China: Evidence from CHARLS |
December 2011 |
 |
Abstract
|
| 6248 |
Juan Carlos Candeal, Esteban Induráin, José Alberto Molina |
Agreement Theory and Consensus |
December 2011 |
 |
Abstract
|
| 6247 |
Fabian Kosse, Friedhelm Pfeiffer |
Impatience among Preschool Children and their Mothers |
December 2011 |
 |
Abstract
|
| 6241 |
Hendrik Schmitz, Nicolas R. Ziebarth |
In Absolute or Relative Terms? How Framing Prices Affects the Consumer Price Sensitivity of Health Plan Choice |
December 2011 |
 |
Abstract
|
| 6235 |
Stefan Eriksson, Dan-Olof Rooth |
Do Employers Use Unemployment as a Sorting Criterion When Hiring? Evidence from a Field Experiment |
December 2011 |
 |
Abstract
|
|
| Back to the top |
Selected Publications |
Journal Articles: |
| Armin Falk |
"Gift Exchange in the Field", in: Econometrica, 2007, 75 (5), 1501-1511. |
| Klaus Fliessbach, Bernd Weber, Peter Trautner, Thomas Dohmen, Uwe Sunde, Christian E. Elger, Armin Falk |
"Social Comparison Affects Reward-Related Brain Activity in the Human Ventral Striatum", in: Science, 2007, 318 (5854), 1305-1308. |
| Armin Falk, James J. Heckman |
"Lab Experiments Are a Major Source of Knowledge in the Social Sciences", in: Science, 2009, 326 (5952), 535 - 538. |
| Johannes Abeler, Steffen Altmann, Sebastian Kube, Matthias Wibral |
"Gift Exchange and Workers' Fairness Concerns: When Equality Is Unfair", in: Journal of the European Economic Association, 2010, 8(6). |
| Thomas Dohmen, Armin Falk, David Huffman, Uwe Sunde |
"Are Risk Aversion and Impatience Related to Cognitive Ability?", in: American Economic Review, 2010, 100(3), 1238-1260. |
| David A. Jaeger, Holger Bonin, Thomas Dohmen, Armin Falk, David Huffman, Uwe Sunde |
"Direct Evidence on Risk Attitudes and Migration", in: Review of Economics and Statistics, 2010, 92(3), 684-689. |
| Sebastian Goerg, Sebastian Kube, Ro'i Zultan |
"Treating Equals Unequally: Incentives in Teams, Workers' Motivation and Production Technology", in: Journal of Labor Economics, 2010, 28 (4), 747 - 772. |
| Johannes Abeler, Armin Falk, Lorenz Goette, David Huffman |
"Reference Points and Effort Provision", in: American Economic Review, 2011, 101 (2), 470-492. |
| Thomas Dohmen, Armin Falk |
"Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences, and Gender", in: American Economic Review, 2011, 101 (2), 556-590. |
| Thomas Dohmen, Armin Falk, David Huffman, Uwe Sunde |
"The Intergenerational Transmission of Risk and Trust Attitudes", in: Review of Economic Studies, 2012, forthcoming. |
| Steffen Altmann, Armin Falk, Matthias Wibral |
"Promotions and Incentives: The Case of Multi-Stage Elimination Tournaments", in: Journal of Labor Economics, 2012, 30 (1), 149-174. |
|
| Back to the top |
| |
|
|